Introduction
As more people obtain access to the internet, a large amount of personal information becomes accessible to e.g. other users, web service providers and advertisers. To counter these problems, more and more devices (e.g. mobile phone) and web services (e.g. facebook) are equipped with mechanisms where the user can specify privacy settings to comply with his/her personal privacy preference.
While this has proven useful for explicit and textual information, we ask how this concept can generalize to visual content. While users can be asked (as we also do in our study) to specify how comfortable they are releasing a certain type of image content, the actual presence of such credit card, face, gender, skin colour, ...
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Privacy Risk Figure 1 : Users often fail to enforce their privacy preferences when sharing images online. We propose a first Visual Privacy Advisor to provide user-specific privacy feedback.
content is implicit in the image and not readily available for a privacy preference enforcing mechanism nor the user. In fact -as our study shows -people frequently misjudge the privacy relevant information content in an image -which leads to the failure of enforcing their own privacy preferences. Hence, we work towards a Visual Privacy Advisor (Figure 1 ) that helps users enforce their privacy preferences and prevents leakage of private information. We approach this complex problem by first making personal information explicit by categorizing personal information into 68 image attributes. Based on such attribute predictions and user privacy preferences, we infer a privacy score that can be used to prevent unintentional sharing of information. Our model is trained to predict the user specific privacy risk and interestingly, it outperforms human judgment on the same images.
Our main contributions in this paper are as follows: (i) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to formulate the problem of identifying a diverse set of personal information in images and personalizing predictions to users based on their privacy preferences (ii) We provide a sizable dataset 1 of 22k images annotated with 68 privacy attributes (iii) We conduct a user study and analyze the diversity of users' privacy preferences as well as the level to which they achieve to follow their privacy preferences on image data (iv) We propose the first model for Privacy Attribute Prediction. We also extend it to directly estimate user-specific privacy risks (v) Finally, we show that our models outperform users in following their own privacy preferences on images
Related Work
Privacy is becoming an increasing concern [48, 10] , especially due to the rise of social networking websites allowing individuals to share personal information, without explaining consequences of these actions. In this section, we discuss work that highlights these concerns and explores consequences of such actions. We also discuss literature that deals with identifying private content in images and text.
Identifying Personal Information
There is a comparably small body of work that aims to recognize personal information. Aura et al. [3] explore this in the context of electronic documents, where they propose a tool to remove user names, identifiers, organization names and other private information from text-based documents with metadata. [5, 13] study this in the context of textual email-content. Bier et al. [5] model this as a privacy-classification problem, whereas Geng et al. [13] detect four types of personal information -email addresses, telephone numbers, addresses and money. The closest related work to ours is [42] , who are also motivated by unwanted disclosure and privacy violation on social media. They approach the task as classifying if an image is public or private based on features extracted from a Convolutional Neural Network and user-generated tags for the image. However, we later show that users have different notions of privacy and hence cannot be modeled as a binary classification problem. Instead, we first tackle a more principled problem of predicting the privacy-sensitive elements present in images and use these in combination with users preferences to estimate privacy risk. Leakage and De-anonymization A problem closely related to ours is privacy leakage, which deals with uncovering and analyzing methods leading to disclosure of personal information, rather than detection before such incidents. [24, 22] uncover privacy leakage when websites accidentally provide user information embedded in HTTP requests when contacting third-party aggregators. As leakages can be user-intended, Yang et al. [47] explore this case in Android applications. Some works [32, 43] study the case where users identity, location or other details can be de-anonymized when aggregating anonymized data across multiple social networks. In contrast to these, our approach is concerned about image content and privacy preferences. [26, 14, 23] study types of personal information disclosed on social networking websites. Other tasks include preserving one's privacy while using social networks [15, 52, 27] and exploring privacy settings [11, 8, 28] . However in our user study, apart from collecting and analyzing user studies on privacy preferences for images, we additionally use them to train models based on image data.
Privacy Preferences and Social Networks
Privacy and Computer Vision Several works explore detecting individual privacy attributes such as license plates [53, 49, 6] , age estimation from facial photographs [4] , social relationships [45] , face detection [40, 44] , landmark detection [51] and occupation recognition [39] . Apart from detecting attributes, some works introduce new privacy challenges in vision such as adversarial perturbations [31, 35] , privacy-preserving video capture [1, 36, 33, 37] , person re-identification [2, 30] , avoiding face detection [46, 16] , full body re-identification [34] and privacy-sensitive lifelogging [18, 20] . In this work, we present a new challenge in computer vision designed to help users assess privacy risk before sharing images on social media that encompasses a broad range of personal information in a single study.
Datasets for Privacy Tasks
Crucial to exploring privacy tasks are images revealing private details such as faces, names or opinions. However, many available datasets do not contain a significant number of such images to effectively study privacy tasks. Although some datasets [12] contain such information, they are either too small or not representative of images on social networks. The closest candidate is the PIPA dataset [50] with 37,107 Flickr images, proposed for people recognition in an unconstrained setting and does not include images covering many other privacy aspects such as license plates, political views or official identification documents. In this paper, we introduce the first dataset of real-life images capturing important privacy-relevant attributes.
The Visual Privacy (VISPR) Dataset
Mobile devices and social media platforms provide privacy settings, so that users can communicate their privacy preferences on the disclosure of different type of textual information. How does this concept transfer to image data? We need to establish a similar concept of privacy relevant information types -but now for images. This will allow us to query users about their privacy preferences on the disclosure of various information types, as we will do in the next section.
Therefore, we propose in this section a categorization of personal information into 68 privacy attributes such as gen-der, tattoo, email address or fingerprint. We collect a dataset of 22k images that allows the study of privacy relevant attributes in images and the training of automatic recognizers.
Privacy Attributes
As motivated before, we need to categorize different types of personal content in images -akin to the privacy settings deployed in today's devices and services. Therefore, we define a list of privacy attributes an image can disclose.
The primary challenge here is the lack of a standard list of privacy attributes. We thus compile attributes from multiple sources. First, we consolidate relevant attributes from the guidelines for handling Personally Identifiable Information [29] provided in the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [9] and the US Privacy Act of 1974. Second, we add relevant attributes from the rules on prohibiting sharing personal information on various social networking websites (e.g., Twitter, Reddit, Flickr). Finally, we manually examine images that are shared on these websites and identify additional attributes. As a result, we draft an initial set of 104 potential privacy attributes. As discussed in the next section, these are reduced to 68 attributes (see Table 1 ) after pruning.
Annotation Setup
The annotation was set up as a multi-label task to three annotators annotating independent sets of images. A webbased tool was provided to select multiple options corresponding to the 104 privacy attributes per image. Additionally, annotators could mark if they were unsure about their annotation. In case none of the provided privacy labels applied, they were instructed to label the image as safe, which we use as one of our privacy attributes. Images were discarded if annotators were unsure, or if the image contained a copyright watermark, was a historic photograph, contained primarily non-English text, or was of poor quality.
Data Collection and Annotation Procedure
In this section, we discuss the steps taken to obtain the final set of 22k images annotated with 68 privacy attributes.
Seed Sample We first gather 100k random images from the OpenImages dataset [21] , a collection of ∼9 million Flickr images. Using the definition and examples of the privacy attributes, the annotators annotate 10,000 images randomly selected from the downloaded images.
Handling Imbalance Based on the label statistics from these 10,000 images, we add images to balance attributes with fewer than 100 occurrences. These additional images are added by querying relevant OpenImages labels possibly representative of insufficient privacy attributes. Extended Search for Rare Classes In spite of using the above strategy, 37 attributes contain under 40 images. We manually add images for these attributes by querying relevant keywords on Flickr. We do not add multiple images from the same album. For credit cards, we manually obtain 50 high-quality images from Twitter, which are the only non-Flickr images in our dataset.
Selected Attributes After annotating the dataset with the initial 104 labels, we discard 19 labels because either (i) images were difficult to obtain manually (e.g. iris/retinal scan, insurance details) or (ii) the set of images did not clearly represent the attribute. We additionally merge groups of attributes which capture similar concepts (e.g. work and home phone number). In the end, we obtain a dataset of 22,167 images, each annotated with one or more of 68 privacy attributes.
Curation To reduce labeling mistakes, we organize the dataset into batches of images with each batch corresponding to a privacy attribute. We curate attribute batches which either contain fewer than 500 images or are considered sensitive by users.
Splits We perform a random 45-20-35 split with 10,000 training, 4,167 validation and 8,000 test images. The final statistics of our dataset is presented in Table 1 . The labels and its distribution in our dataset is shown in Figure 2 .
Understanding Privacy Risks
In this section, we explore how users' personal privacy preferences relate to the attributes in Section 4.1. Furthermore, we study how good users are at enforcing their own privacy preferences on visual data when making judgments based on image data in Section 4.2.
Understanding Users' Privacy Preferences
In this section, we study the degree to which various users are sensitive to the privacy attributes discussed in Section 3.
User Study
We present each user with a series of 72 questions in a randomized order. Each of these questions corresponds to either exactly one of 67 privacy attributes (excluding the safe attribute) or a control question. In each Participants We collect responses of 305 unique AMT workers in this survey. Out of the 305 respondents, 59% were male, 78% were under 40 years of age with 57% from USA and 38% from India. Additionally, 75% were regular Facebook users, 80% and 44% reported to be aware of and have used Twitter and Flickr at least once.
Analysis In order to understand the diversity in users' privacy preferences, we first cluster the users based on their preferences into user privacy profiles. We cluster using Kmeans and choose K based on silhouette score [38] , which considers distance between points within the cluster and additionally distance between points and their neighbouring cluster. We choose K = 30 as this yields the lowest silhouette score. This enables visualizing the preferences over the attributes, as seen in Figure 3 , where each row represents the preferences for one of the 30 user profiles (ordered based on number of users associated with the profile). We observe from this study: (i) Users show a wide variety of preferences. This supports requiring user-specific privacy risk predictions. (ii) The majority (Profiles 1-4, 7-11, 13-14, 18-20 in Figure 3 ) display a similar order of sensitivity to the attributes (iii) A minority (Profiles 21-30) of users are particularly sensitive to some attributes such as their political view, sexual orientation or religion (iv) The uniformly-sensitive users (Profiles 5, 6, 12, 15, 17) are uniformly sensitive to all attributes even though to different degrees.
Users and Visual Privacy Judgment
In this study, we first ask participants to judge their personal privacy risk based on images representing an attribute (providing a visual privacy risk score) and afterwards asking the actual user's privacy preferences for the same attribute (providing a desired or explicit privacy risk score). Hence, we study how good users are at assessing their personal privacy risks based on images.
User Study In this study, we split the survey into two parts. In the first part, the users are shown a group of 3-6 images. Given the sensitive nature of attributes, we cannot obtain or ask users to rate their personal images and hence use images from the dataset. They are asked how comfortable they are sharing such images publicly, considering they are the subject in these images. Responses are collected on a scale of 1 to 5, where: (1) Extremely comfortable (2) Slightly comfortable (3) Somewhat comfortable (4) Not comfortable (5) Extremely uncomfortable. Each group of images represents one of the 68 privacy attributes. In most cases, the attributes occur isolated and are the most prominent visual cue in the image. We refer to these responses as human visual privacy score. The second part is identical to questions and the setting in the previous user-study on privacy preferences. Each question is designed to obtain the privacy preference of the user for each attribute. As before, the user rates on a scale of 1 (Not Violated) to 5 (Extremely Violated). We refer to these responses as privacy preference score.
Participants We split the study into two parts to prevent user fatigue. Each part contains only half of the attributes. We obtain 50 unique responses for this survey from AMT. In each of these parts, roughly: 70% of the respondents were under 40 years, 57% were male and 87% were from USA. Additionally, 80% responded that they use Facebook, 84% Twitter and 46% Flickr.
Analysis We compute for each attribute average privacy preference score and human visual scores, and visualized (ii) For cases close to the diagonal, like credit cards, passport and national identification documents, users display consistent behaviour on images and attributes. (iii) However, when photographs are natural scenes containing people or vehicles, users underestimate (below diagonal) the privacy score, such as in the case of family photographs or cars displaying license plate numbers. We speculate this is indicative of personal photographs commonly shared online.
(iv) They overestimate (above diagonal) the privacy risk of some photographs showing birth place or their name. We speculate this is because the photographs are often official documents, making users more cautious.
Predicting Privacy Risks
In this section, we make a step towards our overall goal of a Visual Privacy Advisor. As illustrated in Figure 5 , we follow a similar paradigm e.g. on social networks that defines privacy risk based on both the content type and userspecific privacy settings. In our case, the content type is described by (user-independent) attributes in the previous section. We combine these with the user-specific privacy preferences to determine if the image contains a privacy vi- 
olation.
We describe our model for privacy attribute prediction in Section 5.1, followed by our approaches to personalized privacy risk prediction in Section 5.2. We conclude with a comparison of human judgment of privacy risks in images against the prediction of our proposed models in Section 5.3.
Privacy Attribute Prediction
In this section, we define the user-independent task of predicting privacy attributes from images. Then, we present and evaluate different methods on our new VISPR dataset.
Task
We propose the task of Privacy Attribute Prediction, which is to predict one or more of 68 privacy attributes based on an image. This can be seen as a multilabel classification problem that recognizes different type of personal information visual data and therefore has the potential to make this information explicit. Figure 1 shows multiple examples for this task. The task is challenging due to image diversity, subtle cues and high level semantics.
Metric To assess performance of methods for this task, we compute the Average Precision (AP) per class, which is the area under Precision-Recall curve for the attribute. Additionally, the overall performance of a method is given by Class-based Mean Average Precision (C-MAP), the average of the AP score across all 68 attributes.
Methods We experiment with three types of visual features extracted from CNNs -CaffeNet [19] , GoogleNet [41] and ResNet-50 [17] . First, we train a linear SVM model using features from the layer preceding the last fullyconnected layer of these CNNs. In a pilot study, we found that the multilabel SVM with smoothed hinge loss [25] yields better results than SVM multi-label prediction [7] and cross-entropy loss. Second, we fine-tune the CNNs initialized with pretrained ImageNet models, based on a multi- Table 2 and qualitative results in Figure 6 (more discussed in supplementary). We additionally present the Average Precision scores per class in Figure 7 . We make the following observations: (i) The CNN performs well in attributes such as tickets, passports, medical treatment that correlated well with scenes (e.g. airport, hospital). It also performs well in recognizing attributes which are humancentric, such as faces, gender and age. (ii) Fine-grained differences cause confusions such as predicting student IDs for drivers licenses or differentiating between street and other signboards. (iii) We observe failure modes due to small details in the image, such as tattoos, marriage rings or a credit card in the hands of a child. (iv) Another shortcoming is not being able to recognize relationship-based attributes (e.g., personal or social relationships, vehicle ownership) which requires reasoning based on interaction of multiple visual cues in an image rather than just their presence.
Personalizing Privacy Risk Prediction
In the previous section, we discussed predicting privacy attributes in images, a task independent of user privacy preferences. In this section, we investigate user-specific visual privacy feedback. The goal is to compute a privacy risk score per image, representing the risk of privacy leakage for the particular user. Task As illustrated in Figure 5 , we combine privacy attributes (user independent) together with the privacy preferences based on these attributes (user specific) to arrive at the privacy risk score. As we allow the users to give scores for each attributes based on their privacy preferences, we define the following privacy risk score. sult, the privacy-risk score is comparable to the preferencescore: 1 (Not Sensitive) to 5 (Extremely Sensitive). As illustrated in Figure 5 , we compute the ground-truth privacy risk score based on ground-truth attribute annotation for an image (represented as a k-hot vector y ∈ {0, 1} A ) and privacy preferences of users.
Method: Attribute Prediction-Based Privacy Risk (AP-PR) Our first method performs Attributed-Based Privacy Risk (AP-PR) prediction. As illustrated in Figure 5 , we combine the privacy attribute prediction and the profile's privacy preferences (that we can assume as provided by users at test time) to compute the privacy risk score as defined above.
Method: Privacy Risk CNN (PR-CNN) We propose a Privacy Risk CNN (PR-CNN) that does not directly use the user profile's privacy preferences -but only indirectly via the ground-truth. The key observation is that AP-PR scores suffer from erroneous attribute predictions (see Figure 7) . Therefore, we extend the the privacy attribute prediction network by additional fully-connected layers to directly predict the privacy risk score. A parameter search yielded best results using additional two fully-connected hidden layers of 128 neurons, each followed by sigmoid activations. We Evaluation We use two metrics for evaluation. First, the L1 error averaged over all images and profiles; it represents the mean absolute difference between the ratings. Secondly, we calculate the Precision-Recall curves for varying thresholds of sensitivity which indicates how well our models detect images above a certain true privacy risk. By calculating the area under the Precision-Recall curves over all user profiles, we additionally report the Mean Average Precision (MAP).
In our experiments, we use the previously introduced user-profiles instead of individual users in order to cater to all the diverse privacy preferences equally that we have seen in the previous section. We assign a privacy risk score of 0.5 for the safe attribute for all profiles.
The evaluation of our approach on these metrics is presented in Table 3 . Each graph in Figure 8 represents PR curves over the ground-truth thresholded to obtain a particular risk interval, such that any score above this threshold is considered private. This allows us to estimate performance of methods at various levels of sensitivity. We then obtain the PR-curves for each sensitivity interval by thresholding scores estimated by AP-PR and PR-CNN.
From these results, we observe: (i) PR-CNN performs better in predicting risk compared to using the intermediate attributes predictions. Notably, the prediction is on average less than one step on the scale from 1 to 5 away from the true privacy risk. (ii) Moreover, it is better at detecting high-risk images, as shown in Figure 8 . In particular, we notice better recall for high-risk images. We discuss profile-specific PR curves in the supplementary material.
Humans vs. Machine
In Section 4, we have shown inconsistency in users' privacy preferences and their assessment of privacy risks in images. In this section, we compare our proposed approach for evaluating privacy risk against human judgments.
In our second user study (subsection 4.2), for each attribute, users first assessed their personal privacy risk on images (providing a visual privacy risk score) and later rated their privacy preference (providing a desired privacy risk score). We have computed scores with our privacy risk models AP-PR and PR-CNN on those very same images.
As a result, for each image, we have (a) users' privacy preference (b) users' privacy risk judgment from images (c) our AP-PR privacy risk score from images (d) our PR-CNN privacy risk score from images. All these scores are on a scale of 1 (Not Sensitive) to 5 (Extremely Sensitive). Using the users desired preference as the groundtruth, we now ask: who is better at reproducing the user's desired privacy preference on images? As from the previous section, we use precision-recall and L 1 -error as metrics to compare the desired preference score (a) and predicted privacy risk score for evaluation (b, c, d).
The precision-recall-curves for the three candidates are presented in Figure 9 . Evaluation using the L 1 -error is discussed in the supplementary material. We observe: (i) AP-PR achieves better precision-recall for the task than PR-CNN and -remarkably -is even consistently better than the users' image-based judgment. (ii) On average, the PR-CNN estimates privacy risks (L 1 error = 1.03) slightly better than the user's image-based judgment (L 1 error = 1.1) and AP-PR (L 1 error = 1.27).
Conclusion
We have extended the concept of privacy settings to visual content and have presented work towards a Visual Privacy Advisor that can provide feedback to the users based on their privacy preferences. The significance of this research direction is highlighted by our user study which shows users often fail to enforce their own privacy preferences when judging image content. Our survey also captures typical privacy preference profiles that show a surprising level of diversity. Our new VISPR dataset allowed us to train visual models that recognize privacy attributes, predict privacy risk scores and detect images that conflict with user's privacy. In particular, a final comparison of human vs. machine prediction of privacy risks on images, shows an improvement by our model over human judgment. This highlights the feasibility and future opportunities of the overarching goal -a Visual Privacy Advisor.
